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B 
EXPLANATORY STATEMENT 
I. Introduction 
1. The European Community is a Community of and for peace. 
The very first paragraphs of the preamble of the Treaty of 
Paris read: 
"Considering that world peace can be safeguarded only by 
creative efforts commensurate with the dangers that threaten 
it, 
Convinced that the contribution which an organised and vital 
Europe can make to civilisation is indispensable to the 
maintenance of peaceful relations". 
2. Much more frequently quoted and thus much better known 
is the 5th paragraph of the preamble to the Treaty which 
proclaims that the Heads of State of the signatory Governments 
were: "Resolved to substitute for age-old rivalries the merging 
of their essential interests: to create, by establishing an 
economic community, the basis for a broader and deeper com-
munity among peoples long divided by bloody conflicts: and to 
lay the foundations for institutions which will give direction 
to a destiny henceforward shared". 
3. Similarly the preamble of the Treaty establishing the 
EEC states that the Heads of State of the signatory Governments 
were: "Determined to lay the foundations of an ever closer 
union among the peoples of Europe" and were "Resolved by thus 
_,.: 
pooling their resources to preserve and strengthen peace and 
liberty, and calling upon the other peoples of Europe who 
share their ideal to join in their efforts". 
4. If many aspects of the operation of the European Com-
munity are controversial and subject to criticism, looking 
back over the history of the Community one fact is undisputed 
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and clear. This is that the creation and working of the 
European Community has knit together the interests of 
the individual Member States so closely that a war between 
the present members is inconceivable. The Community has, 
therefore, changed the course of history for the better by ruling 
out the possibility of wars between Member States, for instance 
between France and Germany. 
5. Amongst the official statements that have been made 
defining the role of the Ten in the world and in preserving 
peace, it seems particularly useful to quote paragraph 9 of 
the Document on European Identity, agreed by the Foreign 
Ministers of the Nine in December 1973: "The Nine intend to 
play an active role in world affairs and thus to contribute, 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations Charter, to ensuring that international relations 
have a more just basis; that the independence and equality 
of states are better preserved; that prosperity is more 
equitably shared; and that the security of each country is 
more effectively guaranteed. In pursuit of these objectives 
the Nine should progressively define common positions in the 
sphere of foreign policy". 
It should also be recalled that the London Report on EPC 
which was adopted by the Foreign Ministers of the Ten on 
13 October 1981 stated: "As regards the scope of European 
Political Cooperation, and having regard to the different 
situations of the Member States, the Foreign Ministers agree 
to maintain the flexible and pragmatic approach which has 
made it possible to discuss in Political Cooperation certain 
important foreign policy questions bearing on the political 
aspects of security". 
6. It is important to note that the proposal for a 
"European Act" put forward in November 1981 by the German 
and Italian Governments, and known as the Genscher-Colombo 
Plan, stated: "convinced that the security of Europe must 
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also be guaranteed by joint action in the field of 
security policy which at the same time helps to maintain 
the common security of the partners in the Atlantic 
Alliance ... It also stated that one of the aims of the 
Heads of State and Government was: 11 the coordination of 
security policy and the adoption of common European positions 
in this sphere in order to safeguard Europe's independence, 
protect its vital interests and strengthen its security ... 
7. It should be recalled that in the preamble to the 
solemn declaration on European Union signed by the Heads 
of State and Government on 19 June 1983 in Stuttgart, the 
signatories set out their conviction: 11 that, by speaking 
with a single voice in foreign policy, including political 
aspects of security, Euro~e can contribute to the preser-
vation of peace ... Amongst the objectives adopted by the 
Heads of State was the strengthening and development of 
.. European Political Cooperation through the elaboration and 
adoption of joint positions and joint action, on the basis 
of intensified consultations, in the area of foreign policy, 
including the coordination of the positions of Member States 
on the political and economic aspects of security, so as to 
promote and facilitate the progressive development of such 
positions and actions in a growing number of foreign policy 
fields 11 • In the declaration the signatories stated that 
European Political Cooperation must be reinforced by, amongst 
other things, 11Coordination of the positions of Member States 
on the political and economic aspects of security ... 
a. If the European Community has been successful in 
creating a Western European security zone, it is the North 
Atlantic Alliance that has, since its creation in 1949, 
deterred external aggression against Western Europe. 
9. It is in this context that the present report lists 
some 11 shared European interests, risks and requirements in 
the security field 11 as suggested in the motion for a resolution 
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tabled by Mr Mommersteeg and others (DOC 1-1294/82). 
The security interests, risks and requirements listed 
do not constitute a comprehensive list. In the nature 
of things they cannot do so. Your rapporteur would 
therefore be grateful if members of the Political Com-
mittee would draw his attention to any particularly 
significant security interests of the Ten which are not 
examined in this document. Further, the present report 
does not "analyse" these interests, risks and requirements, 
as requested by the Mommersteeg motion, quite simply be-
cause any single security interest of the Ten would require 
a full and separate report of its own to do justice to the 
subject. The present report is therefore a kind of blueprint 
for the future. It is suggested that the new European Par-
liament which is due to be elected in June of this year 
could develop the suggestions made in the present report 
and devote a series of reports to the main security problems 
mentioned here. But, in the meantime, it is to be hoped that 
all proposals made by Parliament in any resolution it adopts 
accompanying this report should immediately receive serious 
consideration from the Council and the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in Political Cooperation. 
II. The Atlantic Alliance 
10. The main security interest of the Member States of 
the European Community is the protection of their territory 
against an external attack. Since the Member States of the 
European community would find it difficult if not impossible 
to ensure their own defence against the main potential ag-
gressor, the Soviet Union and the Member States of the 
Warsaw Pact, they have historically entrusted the task of 
their common defence to the Atlantic Alliance in which they 
are joined by a number of other European states, Canada and 
the us. 
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11. It still remains the case that the deterrence pro-
vided by the Alliance depends very largely on the us con-
ventional and nuclear commitment to the defence of Western 
Europe. Although there have been, in the past, political 
and economic tensions between the Western European members 
of the Alliance and the US, and although there are dif-
ferences and tensions today, it is not feasible to conceive 
that the defence of Western Europe can be secured, at least 
in the near future, outside the framework of the Alliance 
or without the active commitment of the us. This commitment 
is expressed through the stationing of some 350.000 US ser-
vicemen in Western Europe, through the deployment of dif-
ferent types of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles 
in Western Europe, and through the targeting of US-based 
strategic missiles on the Soviet Union. US conventional 
forces stationed in Europe can be reinforced by air and sea 
from the US. If the integrated military command structure 
of NATO were to be demolished or if the American conventional 
and nuclear guarantee were to be withdrawn the Member States 
of the European Community would be poorly placed to resist 
major military aggression and would be relatively much more 
subject to external military, political and diplomatic pres-
sure from the Soviet Union. 
12. Whatever reservations some individual Member States 
of the European Community might have about their own parti-
cipation - or full participation - in the work of the 
Alliance, it is hard to see how, either in the present or 
in the near future, the security shield provided by the 
Alliance could be replaced by an alternative security system 
for the West. It is, therefore, a major security interest 
of the Ten that the North Atlantic Alliance should continue 
in an effective form. This said, there are ways in which 
the working of the Alliance could be modified so as to 
ensure that the interests of the Member States of the 
European Community are more strongly reflected within the 
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North Atlantic Council and within the Alliance as a 
whole. Proposals to this effect are put forward in the 
conclusions. 
13. Although the countries of Western Europe depend 
heavily on the US conventional and nuclear commitment 
for their security, within the framework of the North 
Atlantic Alliance, this does not mean that interests of 
the Ten and those of the US are always identical or even 
similar with regard to problems of international policy. 
The tendency of President Reagan's Administration to take 
dramatic policy initiatives without prior consultation 
with the European members of the Alliance has caused wide-
spread concern within Western Europe. 
III. Eastern Europe 
14. The countries of Western Europe are linked to those 
of Eastern Europe by geography, history and in some cases 
language and culture. It is, therefore, an interest of 
Western Europe to reduce, as far as possible, political, 
military and other tensions between the two parts of divided 
Europe. The continuing CSCE procedures which include, for 
instance, the Stockholm Conference on confidence-building 
measures and security and disarmament in Europe, which opened 
on 7 January 1984, provide an opportunity for the Ten to play 
an active role in this process. 
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IV. World Security 
15. The security of Western Europe is not, however, 
limited to the problems of its relations with the Soviet 
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe and those of 
its relations with the us. The security of Western Europe 
is part of world security. Since the Community is the 
world's largest trading block its Member States cannot 
remain indifferent to threats to world security wherever 
these may appear. The possibility that a regional conflict 
in the Middle East or in the Caribbean might escalate into 
a world war involving the super powers and Western Europe 
itself cannot be ignored. The maintenance of world security 
as well as the security of Western Europe is therefore 
another major European interest. Suggestions as to how the 
Ten could play a role in helping to maintain world security 
are made in the conclusions. 
16. One aspect of world security which has already given 
rise to concern on the part of the Ten is the field of 
human rights. One of the main destabilizing factors in 
international affairs is the suppression or limitation of 
human rights by authoritarian regimes. Within the European 
community it is the European Parliament that has taken the 
lead that the Ten should defend, with other like-minded 
countries, human rights throughout the world, and should 
oppose racism and apartheid. It has also emphasized the 
need to promote forces working ,for democracy wherever this 
is feasible. In its debates and resolutions Parliament has 
already made a certain impact on the external relations 
of the Ten in this sense. Parliament's repudiation of the 
Colonels led to the freezing of the Association Agreement 
between the Community and Greece, and Parliament played a 
useful role in encouraging the democratic political parties 
which replaced the Franco and Salazar regimes in Spain and 
Portugal. Thus one of the most useful contributions Member 
States of the community can make towards a more secure 
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world is the further development of an active policy 
in the human rights field. Parliament itself needs 
little encouragement in moving towards this aim but 
it should give more thought to ways and means of putting 
pressure on the Council, the Commission, and the Foreign 
Ministers meeting in EPC to implement its own human rights 
goals in the conduct of the external relations of the 
Community and of EPC. 
17. As the United Nations is the major international 
organization concerned with world security, it is an 
interest of the Member States of the European Community 
to make effective use of their joint influence within 
the UN in encouraging that body to be as effective as 
possible in its attempts to maintain world peace. 
18. The Ten have developed, over the years, a tradition 
of effective cooperation concerning major political issues 
discussed in the General Assembly. Thus the President in 
Office of the Council of Ministers regularly speaks for 
the Ten as a whole, and the Political Directors of the 
Ten regularly coordinate national attitudes concerning 
agenda items at the General Assembly before debates and 
votes take place. 
19. It seems therefore that a significant interest of 
the Ten, acting within the framework of EPC, is to continue 
to strengthen its collective action within the UN. In par-
ticular attempts should be made to increase still further 
the proportion of occasions on which the Ten vote unanimous-
ly on major issues in the General Assembly. 
V. The Developing World 
20. There is little doubt that the creation and maintenance 
of economic prosperity is one of the main forces working 
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for international security. Political unrest and violence 
thrive in those countries or regions where poverty and 
malnutrition prevail. As an economic and trading grouping 
the European Community is well placed, and indeed has a 
great responsibility, to help the promotion of higher living 
standards in the developing world. The operation of the LOME 
Convention, which links more than 60 African, Caribbean and 
Pacific countries to the Community, demonstrates the serious-
ness with which the Community has taken up this challenge. 
Consideration might usefully be given by the Member States, 
particularly within the framework of EPC, as to whether it 
might not be possible to develop closer political links 
between the ACP/EEC countries with a view to the development 
of joint attitudes to major international problems, including 
problems with security implications. The ACP/EEC Consultative 
Assembly has already taken a stand on apartheid in South Africa 
and has dealt with other human rights issues. The question 
might also be posed as to how far the ACP/EEC institutions 
might usefully concern themselves with questions of human 
rights within the participating countries. 
Quite apart from the possible development of a political role 
by the ACP/EEC institutions, it would seem to be a major in-
terest of the Ten to continue to build further on the LOME 
convention in the future with the aim of trying to increase 
not only economic prosperity but also the overall stability 
of the countries involved, as well as of developing closer 
mutual understanding between them. 
VI. Shipping routes 
21. In the context of the Community's trade links not only 
with the ACP countries but with other trading partners through-
out the world, the question is posed of the protection of the 
shipping routes used to transport imports to the Community. 
- 16 - ) PE 88.462/fin. 
A high proportion of the C~~unity's imports travel by sea, 
and this is particularly so in the case of oil and important 
raw materials such as manganese, chrome, cobalt, platinum, 
tungsten and vanadium. The situation concerning the community's 
dependence on imports of oil and these primary materials has 
been pointed out in the oral question to the Commission by 
Mrs Moreau, Mrs Lenz, Mr Filippi, Mr Jonker and Mr de Keers-
maeker (European Parliament sitting 14/1/1980). In his report 
for the Political Committee adopted in November 1981 
(DOC 1-697/80) Mr Diligent an~lysed the problems concerning 
the surveillance and protection of shipping routes for sup-
plies of energy and strategic materials fo* the countries of 
the European Community. The Dilig@nt report pointed to the 
vulnerability of the sea rout~• ~n which the Community depends 
for such imports. In order to prevent a blockade of sea borne 
imports or the cutting of sea routes by armed intervention, 
Parliament, in its resolution of 19/ll/lg&l pointed out: 
"that one of the European Community's main concerns is to 
promote the economic development of the Third World, which 
would be seriously and permanently jeopardized if interruption 
of deliveries were to lead to a scarcity of oil and a succes-
sion of price increases". Most notably, the resolution called: 
"on the Member State$ with-tlaval forces to c9ordinate their 
patrols outside the zone cov~red by the North Atlantic Treaty 
and to strengthen their naval,forces, and to do so within the 
' - - - -. 
framework of European Political CoOperation". 
22. NATO itself is pawerless to take action to protect 
Western Europe's sea supply routes outside the geographical 
area covered by the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
The task of protecting sea lanes in the South Atlantic and 
the Indian Ocean could, therefore, most appropriately be 
carried out by those of the Ten possessing adequate naval 
resources and willing to undertake this obligation. 
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In normal times of peace it would be sufficient for the 
Member States directly involved to establish contingency 
plans and to hold occasional exercises. Proposals con-
cerning the protection of supply routes at sea are set 
out in the conclusions. 
VII. East-West arms control negotiations 
23. This section of the report concentrates mainly on 
the INF negotiations in view of the impact on the security 
of the Ten of the issues under negotiation. It should be 
recalled, however, that other important East-West arms 
control negotiations have been in progress for a number of 
1 years. After more than 10 years the MBFR talks have not 
yet led to substantive results, for reasons explained by 
Mr Haagerup in his recent report on EPC and European Secu-
rity. The START2 negotiations which have been in progress 
in Geneva since June 1982 continue, as Mr Haagerup also 
explaine in his report, the earlier Strategic Arms Limit-
ation Talks (SALT). These negotiations have run into trouble 
' both because of the deployment of Pershing-IIs and in part 
because whereas the Soviet Union wishes to freeze existing 
levels of nuclear weapons, the us Administration wishes to 
achieve reductions in existing levels of ballistic missile 
warheads. The INF talks were broken off by the USSR on 23 
November 1983 without a date being set for their resumption. 
No date was set by the USSR for the resumption of the START 
talks when the last round ended on 8 December 1983. Subse-
quently the MBFR talks were also suspended, but they should 
resume in March 1984. 
24. Since arms control and arms reduction clearly consti-
tute important elements of European security, the Ten have 
an interest in the resumption and successful conclusion of 
all three sets of negotiations. But the results of 
1 Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction 
2 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks 
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both sets of talks can only be useful if they are balanced 
and mutual. It is also essential that the Ten are fully 
consulted and informed by the US of all developments in 
these negotiations. Thus the Ten should insist on prior 
consultation before the US Government takes major initiatives 
in these or other arms control negotiations. Whereas the 
START talks are limited to the US and the USSR, a number of 
Member States of the Community participate in the MBFR nego-
tiations at Vienna. Although the European Member States of 
NATO are involved in a special consultative group which 
exists in NATO and which is responsible for allied concertation 
of the INF talks, and informal arrangements of a similar kind 
apply to the START talks, it is by no means clear whether this 
machinery really provides for effective consultation of its 
allies by the US. 
25. The negotiations which have continued between the US 
and the Soviet Union in Geneva since November 1981 and which 
were broken off in November 1983 without a date being fixed 
for their resumption - the INF1 talks - have made little 
progress but are of great potential significance to European 
security. The core of the negotiations is to what extent the 
Soviet Union is prepared to reduce or end the deployment of 
its SS-20 missiles, targeted on Western Europe, and to what 
extent the US will deploy Pershing-II and cruise missiles in 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom 
in 1983, and in Belgium and the Netherlands in subsequent 
years. 
26. Britain and France, which possess independent nuclear 
forces, have not taken part in the Geneva talks. Whereas the 
Soviet Union has insisted that French and British nuclear 
weapons should be taken into account in the talks, the US has 
formally maintained (though the sincerity of this attitude 
has been questioned by the USSR) that the British and French 
1 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces 
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nuclear weapons are "strategic" in nature and do not, there-
fore, qualify for inclusion in negotiations which are solely 
concerned with intermediate-range nuclear weapons1 • 
27. Despite the breakdown at Geneva it would perhaps be un-
duly pessimistic to write off the talks as a failure. A number 
of serious proposals have been made, and given a better poli•. 
tical atmosphere some results might be obtained in the future 
either on the basis of these proposals or new ones. The most 
important of the proposals put forward so far include: first, 
the US "zero option"; second, the Soviet proposal to withdraw 
SS-20s into the eastern part of the USSR; third, the "walk-in-
the-woods", suggested by the chief US and Soviet negotiatorsr 
and, fourth, another alleged proposal of the same negotiators, 
which has been called the "walk-in-the-park". 
The "zero option" called for the destruction of all SS-20s 
(and also the earlier, less sophisticated SS-4s and Ss) in ex-
change for an agreement not to deploy Pershing-IIs and cruise 
missiles in Western Europe. An original Soviet offer to with-
draw all their SS-20s east of the 80° longitude line, in ex-
change for an agreement not to deploy Pershing-II or cruise 
missiles, has now been replaced by a more recent offer to move 
any SS-20s in Northern Russia considerably further to the East, 
in response to an American objection that because of the cur-
vature of the earth missiles based close to the 80° line in 
Northern Russia would be much nearer to Western Europe than 
those based further south. The "walk-in-the-woods" proposal 
made by Paul Nitze and Yuli Kvitsinsky, the two chief negotiators, 
but rejected by their governments, was that the Soviet Union 
should be allowed to deploy 75 SS-20s in "European Russia" and 
1 Both the British and French Governments plan to modernize 
their nuclear forces and to increase substantially the 
numbers of nuclear warheads available to them. Thus Britain's 
new trident submarines will carry up to 16 missiles with 
14 warheads each, totalling 896 warheads. The French Govern-
ment plans to increase its land-based missiles to 54 and 
its submarine-borne warheads to 576. 
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90 in the eastern part of the USSR; neither side was to 
deploy in Europe more than 150 of certain specified types 
of aircraft capable of delivering nuclear weapons; NATO 
was to be permitted to deploy 75 cruise missile-launchers 
with 4 missiles each, but no Pershing-II missiles; and fresh 
negotiations were to open on further reductions immediately 
this agreement was signed. The "walk-in-the-park" proposal, 
attributed by Mr Nitze to his Soviet negotiating partner, 
but subsequently disclaimed by the Soviet Government, suggested 
that if the US proposed equal reductions of 572 warheads on 
each side this would be acceptable to the Soviet Government 
which would also end its insistence, that British and French 
nuclear weapons be included in an initial INF agreement. 
The European allies were not, apparently, immediately informed 
of this plan, but in any event it was not acceptable to the 
US Administration and was later disowned by the Soviet Govern-
ment. Since the breakdown of the INF talks, immediately fol-
lowing the decision to start the deployment of Pershing-IIs, 
the USSR has starteo to deploy new submarine-launched missiles and 
new SS-20s in the DDR and Czechoslovakia. 
28. The summary given above is necessarily simplistic, and 
no reference is made to a number of important elements in the 
talks. After assessing the state of play at Geneva your rap-
porteur wishes to make some personal observations. 
First, the way in which the Soviet Union has conducted the 
talks gives the impression that it is seeking to force its own 
view of European security on the us and Europe. European secu-
rity, in Soviet thinking, is subordinated to that of the Soviet 
Union. As US Assistant Secretary of State for European affairs 
Richard Burt has written, in the "Herald Tribune" of 15 April 
1983: "This Soviet view of European security makes the Soviet 
reaction to the NATO decision of 1979 to deploy American inter-
mediate-range missiles to Europe much more comprehensible. 
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The current objective of Soviet policy is to employ its 
geopolitical advantage and its regional nuclear superiority 
to intimidate Western Europe and force West European accom-
modation to Soviet interests". 
29. In the same article the writer goes on to set out, ad-
mittedly from the US viewpoint, a very clear perception of 
Western Europe's interests in the deployment of Pershing-IIs 
and cruise missiles: "The deployment of 572 new American mis-
siles, capable of reaching only limited areas of the Soviet 
Union, has little impact upon the US - Soviet balance, at a 
time when both sides have more than 10.000 warheads, deliverable 
on short notice to any location in the other's country. Yet by 
firmly linking US power to European security, this deployment 
will prevent Moscow from making Western Europe a nuclear hostc~e 
and thus achieving its objective of enforcing the subordination 
of European security to its own". 
30. At this point it is necessary to recall that when NATO 
decided to deploy the new nuclear weapons in 1979 it also de-
cided to withdraw 1.000 nuclear warheads. In October 1983 it 
decided to remove a further 2.000 warheads from Western Europe 
over a 5 year period. If the 572 new missiles are deployed 
there will still be an overall reduction of 1.428 missiles -
or about 2.500 since 1979 -which will bring the total of nu-
clear warheads deployed in Western Europe down to its lowest 
for some 20 years. It is, therefore, not in the West that the 
number of nuclear warheads is growing. 
31. The main long-term interest of the Ten, and of Western 
Europe as a whole, in the Geneva negotiations is that there 
can be mutual agreement between East and West on the limitation 
and progressive elimination of intermediate-range missiles in 
Europe. But until this aim can be achieved the immediate 
interest of the Ten, and of the West, is that deployment of 
Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles should continue, as agreed 
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in NATO in 1979, to provide Western Europe with a nuclear 
balance to the Soviet SS-20s targeted on Western Europe. 
The key vote taken by the Bundestag on 22 November 1983 
permitted the all-important deployment of Pershing-IIs in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. Your rapporteur greatly 
regrets the fact that, despite ex-Chancellor Schmidt's 
powerful arguments in favour of the deployment of new mis-
siles in Western Europe, the SPD voted against, thus creating 
doubts about Germany's reliability as a member of the Alliance. 
On his side President Mitterand has been most firm in sup-
porting the deployment of nuclear forces in western Europe, 
and his comment on the overall situation is most pertinent: 
"Les missiles sont a l'Est: les pacifistes sont a l'Ouest". 
32. It should be noted that in turning down, on its side, 
the "walk-in-the-woods" formula the US Administration did 
not consult its European allies, nor did it do so, apparently, 
concerning the "walk-in-the-park" suggestion. 
33. In the context of the missile debate it should be noted 
that President Reagan, earlier this year, revived the idea of 
developing, in the us, new weapons designed to destroy incoming 
Soviet missiles with the objective of substituting a defensive 
for a retaliatory nuclear strategy. Not only would this violate 
the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty but it would do much to 
destabilize, even further, the present tense relationship between 
the us and the Soviet Union. Your rapporteur considers that it 
is a clear interest of the Ten to discourage President Reagan 
from going ahead with the development of a new nation-wide 
ABM-system. Initiatives should be taken, within the framework 
of EPC, to put pressure on the US Administration in this sense. 
34. The MBFR negotiations are due to start up again in March 
1984. Your rapporteur hopes that it will be possible to resume 
the INF and START talks before too long, despite the negative 
East-West mood that still persists following the decisions to 
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deploy Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles and to break off 
the INF talks. It might be, however, that the East-West 
nuclear arms reduction negotiations could be resumed in a 
new form, that of a single global negotiation covering both 
strategic and intermediate-range nuclear weapons. 
VIII. CSCE follow-up 
35. The results of the Madrid CSCE follow-up conference 
held between November 1982 and September 1983 were extremely 
limited. The next follow-up conference is due to be held in 
Vienna, opening in November 1986. Before then a number of 
follow-up and preparatory meetings will be held. 
36. On the economic, scientific, technical and environmental 
sides of CSCE - generally known as 11 Basket 2 11 - it now seems 
as though the UN Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) will 
prove to be the main forum in which initiatives proposed by 
the participating countries might be discussed and handled. 
Thus although the European Community provides the main input 
into the preparation and negotiation of agenda items of CSCE, 
on the western side, the scope for its direct involvement in 
follow-up activities would appear to be limited. 
37. However, as European states, the Ten have a clear in-
terest in the security aspects of CSCE treated in "Basket 1 11 • 
At Madrid it was agreed that a special conference should be 
held, within the framework of CSCE, on confidence-building 
measures and security and disarmament in Europe and also that 
the first part of this conference should be held in Stockholm, 
beginning in January 1984. Any progress achieved at Stockholm 
will be evaluated at the overall Vienna follow-up meeting. 
38. The Stockholm meeting, which began in January, as fore-
seen, is examining confidence-building measures covering the 
whole of Europe together with the neighbouring sea and air 
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spaces. It was agreed in Madrid that these measures should 
be military significant and politically binding and should 
be accompanied by adequate forms of verification. The aim, 
agreed on at Madrid, is that these confidence-building 
measures should reduce the risk of military confrontation 
in Europe. The Stockholm conference is empowered to provide 
for the appropriate ways and means by which agreements reached 
there would enter into force. It should be noted that the West 
has already published a considerable amount of information on 
the holding of military manoeuvres etc. since transparency of 
this kind is natural within the open, democratic societies of 
the West. 
:9. However, the Stockholm talks constitute only one strand in 
a complex pattern in which the suspended parallel negotiations 
on conventional force reductions <MBFR) and on intermediate-
range nuclear weapons (INF) also constitute important elements. 
The aim of the Ten should therefore be to encourage the US and 
USSR to resume the INF talks at Geneva and to revitalize the 
wilting MBFR negotiations at Vienna when these begin again in 
March 1984. All this depends not only on the interest and poli-
tical will of the Ten, but also on the interest and political 
will of the US and the Soviet Union. The Ten should therefore 
join the US Administration in trying to convince the Soviet 
Union that its own vital security interests - as well as those 
of the US and of Western Europe - would be best served by a 
rapid resumption of the INF talks, possibly in a modified form 
linked to the START talks. Taken together these negotiations 
could lead to a better climate of international confidence. The 
long-term aims of CSCE follow-up should be to reduce levels of 
offensive weapons and military forces to the minimum and, also, 
to create conditions in which real progress can be made con-
cerning the protection of human rights and concerning the 
development of East-West economic cooperation. 
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41. The Middle East has presented a continuing danger to 
world, and therefore European, security over a period of 
years. 
42. The main recent stand taken by Parliament on the 
Middle East was the resolution it adopted accompanying the 
Penders report (DOC 1-786/82). Although the Penders report 
examined the situation in the Middle East in a searching 
and comprehensive way this situation has changed dramatically 
in recent months. Not only has violence within Lebanon 
continued to escalate, but the international security 
situation surrounding Lebanon has deteriorated and the US 
Administration has become directly involved in cross-frontier 
military operations. An alignment of European with US poli-
cies in the Middle East, which seemed appropriate at the end 
of 1982, is certainly no longer reasonable as far as Lebanon 
is concerned. 
43. In general terms the Ten should not allow themselves 
to be drawn into a situation of polarization in which they 
become allies of Israel and the US against members of the 
Arab League and Palestinian independence movements. This is 
not to say that the Ten should disown Israel or take sides 
with the Arabs against it. It merely means that the Ten 
should continue to work for a settlement of the Middle East 
problem in which both the territorial integrity of Israel 
and the rights of the Palestinians are recognized and 
guaranteed. 
44. Since President Reagan seems to have departed from 
a policy of impartiality as between Israel and the Arab 
States, the time might be ripe for diplomatic initiatives 
by the Ten, acting through EPC, directed at obtaining a 
solution to the Middle East problem based on the Resolutions 
242 and 338 of the UN Security Council, the Venice Declaration 
of the Nine, of June 1980, and the main principles and key 
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points of the peace plan for the Middle East proposed 
by Prince Fahd of Saudi Arabia in 1981 and also those 
contained in the resolution of the conference of Arab 
Heads of State adopted at Fez in 1982. These texts, to-
gether with other relevant official documents, are an-
nexed to the Penders report. It is clear, however, that 
the emphasis placed on the role of the Palestine Libera-
tion Organization (PLO) by the Fez resolution is no 
longer relevant. In preparing diplomatic initiatives the 
Ten should seek to involve Egypt as well as the members 
of the Arab League. 
45. The Ten should attempt, through EPC, to restrict 
the US military role in Lebanon to one of internal peace-
keeping involving no further cross-frontier military 
operations and should also seek to influence the US Ad-
ministration to return to a more measured Middle East 
policy aiming at a solution in which the recognition and 
integrity of Israel are balanced by self-determination 
for the Palestinian people. 
46. The establishment of an independent Turkish Cypriot 
state in November 1983 was denounced immediately by the 
Foreign Ministers of the Ten. The Ten cannot allow the 
status quo in Cyprus to continue without trying to pro-
mote a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem within 
an international framework. It is suggested that under 
this and the next Presidencies the Foreign Ministers, with-
in EPC, should attempt to prepare and convene an interna-
tional conference on Cyprus at which the Cypriot Govern-
ment and the Turkish Government, together with representa-
tives of the TUrkish community should participate along 
with the Ten. Of the three Guarantor Powers, which are 
responsible for ensuring the application of the Agreements 
of Zurich and London, Britain and Greece are members of 
the community, and Turkey is the third. Although a con-
ference of this kind would be 
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difficult to prepare it would seem as though the Ten 
might be able to make a useful contribution to a mutually 
acceptable and lasting solution to the Cyprus problem. 
Such a conference could only be successful if all the 
directly interested parties agreed to take part. It would 
also seem useful to involve the UN in the preparation of 
such a conference. In the absence of a solution to the 
Cyprus problem acceptable to the three Guarantor Powers, 
the Government of Cyprus and the Turkish community in 
Cyprus, the situation on the island will continue to con-
stitute a danger to European security. 
47. Within the limited confines of a single report it 
is not possible to analyse the security problems posed 
to the Ten by other geographical areas. All that is pos-
sible is to list some regional problems and to suggest 
that the next directly elected Parliament should carry 
out individual studies concerning them, as appropriate. 
Apart from the Middle East and Cyprus problems, which 
have been examined above, the principal areas raising 
problems for European security would seem to be the fol-
lowing. First, the Horn of Africa, concerning which it 
would not be appropriate to comment in detail in view of 
the forthcoming report of Mr Ripa di Meana. But, in general 
terms, the Ten, in EPC, might try to counter Soviet in-
volvement in Ethiopia and to strengthen Somalia and Djibouti. 
The Foreign Ministers might also examine the possibility of 
trying to create an EPC approach to the Red Sea States 
(Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Djibouti and Somalia) along the lines 
of the (as yet unsuccessful) Gulf States approach. 
The Foreign Ministers should also be urged to follow up 
the resolution adopted by Parliament in 1981, accompanying 
the report by Mrs Wieczorek-Zeul, on the Gulf States. 
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Second, the South Atlantic. Follow-up to the Diligent 
report concerning the protection of sea routes is sug-
gested elsewhere in this report. Further, West African 
countries participating in the North-South Dialogue 
could be encouraged, by the Foreign Ministers, to prevent 
further Soviet supply facilities being offered beyond 
those in Mali and Angola. The Foreign Ministers should 
study the political and security implications for the 
Ten of the new military airport constructed by the British 
Government on the Falklands, including the effects on 
Argentina and Brazil and the possibility of using this 
airport for South Atlantic and Antarctic security. 
Third, Iberia. Here the Foreign Ministers, in EPC, should 
examine the security implications of Portuguese and 
Spanish accession to the Community, particularly as con-
cerns the North and South Atlantic. The Foreign Ministers 
might also examine what action might usefully be taken to 
counter Libyan intervention in Morocco and Mauretania. 
The entry of Spain would provide a useful opportunity for 
the Foreign Ministers, in EPC, to study long-term and mu-
tually acceptable solutions to the Gibraltar question. 
Fourth, the Balkans. The CSCE follow-up meetings provide 
an opportunity for the Ten, within EPC, to examine, parti-
cularly in view of Greek membership, ways and means of 
encouraging the search for greater political and military 
stability in the Balkan area. Fifth, the Nordic area. 
Likewise, the Ten have an interest to prepare, within EPC, 
initiatives, which could be taken within CSCE follow-up 
meetings to promote political and military stability in 
Northern Europe. 
48. The situation in Northern Ireland has constituted a 
threat to security over a long period of years. Comment on 
Northern Ireland in the present report would be inappropriate 
in view of Mr Haagerup's report on this matter. 
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49. It is not difficult to think of other areas of 
the world, such as Afghanistan, the Caribbean, and 
Poland, which at present constitute or are potential 
threats to world security and thus to the security of 
the Ten. However, your rapporteur considers that it 
would not be useful to try to examine, within a single 
document of limited length, every existing or potential 
threat to European security. He has therefore attempted 
to concentrate on some of those problems which seem to 
have the greatest or the most immediate impact on the 
security of the Ten. 
X. Parliament and European security 
SO. As far as Parliament itself is concerned, it might 
develop its concern with matters directly affecting the 
security of the Ten in the following ways. First, it 
should intensify oral and written questions addressed to 
the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC under rules 44 and 
46 of the Rules of Procedure. In this respect it would 
be helpful if the Foreign Ministers were represented on 
at least two days per session, as Lady Elles suggested 
in her report on EPC of 1981. Second, it should ensure 
that all significant security aspects of international 
issues directly affecting the Ten should be fully covered 
by reports from the appropriate committees of Parliament, 
and subsequently in debates in plenary session1 
Although a number of Parliament's committees, for instance 
the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, the com-
mittee on Energy and Research, and the Committee on External 
Economic Relations, clearly have interests in certain secu-
rity aspects of the work of the Community, it is evident 
1 This requirement, together with similar requirements on 
the part of a number of Parliament's committees to cover 
fully subjects of concern to them, might necessitate 
longer and/or more plenary sessions. 
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that it is the Political Affairs Committee which has 
the main interest and responsibility. The Political 
Affairs Committee is already in a position to question 
the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC on the security 
aspects of their activities,in the quarterly colloquies. 
Further, the Political Affairs Committee has, over the 
years, submitted a series of reports to Parliament on 
the security aspects of foreign policy, the operation of 
EPC and other matters related to security, including for 
instance the reports by Mr Fergusson and your present rap-
porteur dealing with armaments procurement cooperation 
and arms sales to third countries1 • 
In order to permit the Political Committee, and Parliament 
as a whole, to hold adequately and professionally prepared 
discussions on the security aspects of the work of the 
Community and of the Ten the Political Committee could 
usefully establish a subcommittee on the political aspects 
of security. 
51. It has been suggested by some Members of the Political Affairs Committee 
that a permanent sub-committee dealing with the political and economic aspects 
of security could include the following tasks in its range of activities. First, 
the identification and analysis of shared interests, risks and requirements in 
security matters. Second, to send fact-finding missions to the capitals of 
the Member States. Third, to invite prominent security experts to make state-
ments to it during the course of hearings which it would organize. Fourth, to 
maintain contacts with NATO, WEU and other relevant organizations. Fifth, to 
draft and submit to Parliament Opinions concerning matters relevant to security 
being reported on by the various committees of the European Parliament. This 
list of tasks is obviously neither an all-embracing nor exclusive one. 
52. The question arises of whether the European Parliament 
might usefully, following the European elections that are 
due to be held in June of this year, examine the possibility 
of establishing flexible links with the Assembly of Western 
European Union (WEU), which has defence competences and a 
long-standing tradition of excellent reports on security 
matters. 
1 The Political Affairs Committee has also held 
hearings on security problems in London in 1981 
and in Brussels in 1982. 
XI. Conclusions 
(A) Relations between the Ten and the Atlantic Alliance1 
---------------------------------------------------
53. There are good reasons for the Ten developing closer 
links with the North Atlantic Alliance. It is thus desirable 
that the policy of Member States should be more closely 
coordinated concerning security matters. 
54. A practical way of achieving this aim would be for 
the Ten to prepare joint attitudes concerning selected 
issues in advance of meetings of the North Atlantic Council 
or of other organs of the Alliance. This could be done 
within EPC and this process would not require new or formal 
institutional links between the EEC and NATO. Although Ire-
land is not a member of the Alliance there is no reason why 
she should not cooperate in these matters if she wishes to 
do so. 
55. The hope would be that the Ten could make the same 
sort of joint impact on the work of the Atlantic Alliance, 
within certain limits, as they already have when acting in 
unison within the General Assembly of the United Nations, 
or when they are represented by a single spokesman at CSCE 
follow-up meetings. Developments in this sense could lead 
to the strengthening of the European and of the Transat-
lantic partnership, not least through the linkage of the 
economic and political policies of the Ten in dealing with 
the outside world, friendly or otherwise. 
56. Because the EEC is the largest trading and productive 
block in the world, and therefore potentially the most in-
fluential global economic force, it is essential that its 
economic and political strategies, especially in regard to 
security, do not pull in opposite or different directions. 
1 The proposals made in section (A) of the conclusions 
have been drafted in close cooperation with Mr 
Fergusson. 
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Just as the Community has to organize its political 
and economic tactics together in dealing with the 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, so it is necessary 
that the West as a whole should marshal its economic 
and political strength to the same ends. 
57. Since the Alliance and the Community are both 
closely concerned in the economic situation of the 
Soviet bloc as a whole, and the Soviet Union in parti-
cular, it seems absurd for the Alliance and the Com-
munity not to pool specialized information on this mat-
ter. 
58. As one means of preventing undue divergences be-
tween the security and economic policies of the Ten 
vis-a-vis the Soviet bloc it is suggested that the de-
velopment of informal links between the Economic Direc-
torate of NATO, the Commission and the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in EPC should be encouraged. 
59. The need for Community coordination in security 
matters points to the meeting of Ministers responsible 
for security within EPC on occasions when the Foreign 
Ministers do not have the expertise to deal with the 
security aspects of problems discussed - a proposal al-
r8ady explored in the Blumenfeld report of 1977, and in 
the Elles report of 1981. 
60· A suitable means of achieving general cooperation 
in security matters and the consequent ability for Com-
munity policy to be expressed by a single voice, would 
be for the Permanent Representatives of the Nine {the . 
Ten minus Ireland) to the North Atlantic Council to main-
tain contact with the EPC structure {which includes Ire-
land), with the objective of identifying the issues on 
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which a joint approach would be helpful. Thereafter the 
Ten's collective position could normally be presented in 
the North Atlantic Council by a representative of the 
State holding the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. 
When Ireland holds the Presidency the position of the Ten 
could be stated by a representative of the preceding 
and/or following Presidency. 
61. Equally, officials from national Ministries respon-
sible for security might usefully take part in meetings 
of Political Directors or of EPC working parties in which 
foreign policy matters with complex or technical security 
aspects are examined. 
6.2. If the existing restricted "Troika" team of officials 
serving the Presidency of EPC were to be expanded or be-
come a permanent secretariat it should almost certainly in-
clude security experts. This is not an innovation in terms 
of cooperation. Foreign Ministry officials working within 
the EPC framework developed close links with NATO when 
preparing the CSCE and its sequels. The Commission itself 
was also partly involved in that process. 
63. Greater cooperation between the Alliance and the 
Community could also lead to significant improvements in 
security contingency planning, including: the conversion 
of certain European industries for defence purposes in 
the event of an immediate threat of war; food and agri-
culture planning; and stockpiling of essential supplies. 
64. As regards conventional armaments procurement 
cooperation, the general ideas set out in the report 
which accompanied the resolution adopted by Parliament 
on 14 June 1978, for which your present rapporteur was 
also the rapporteur, should be developed and carried 
through in the form of the precise proposals more recently 
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made by Parliament in the resolution it adopted on 
26 October 1983, accompanying the Fergusson report. 
(B) Relations between the Ten and the United States 
65. In order to promote better mutual understanding, 
as concerns international affairs, between the us Govern-
ment and the Ten and so as to avoid or at least minimize 
significant divergences between the Transatlantic part-
ners over major world issues some form of high-level 
contact body is needed to link the US Government and the 
Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC. Its main function would 
be to ensure effective consultation between the Ten and 
the US concerning major foreign policy initiatives, in-
cluding those with security implications. 
66. A more dynamic procedure than the present 11 Gymnich 
Formula .. for consulting third countries on EPC matters 
is needed. The appropriate solution could be that the 
US be involved in EPC, in two or three successive stages, 
as are applicant countries for EEC membership, for instance 
Greece in the past, and Spain and Portugal at present. 
In the first stage such countries are informed of EPC dis-
cussions and decisions after the event, as is the case 
with Norway at present. In the second stage they are in-
formed in advance of discussions and likely decisions. 
In the third and final stage they are consulted in advance 
of EPC meetings which gives them an opportunity to influence 
discussions and decisions. Had a "super-Gymnich Formula" 
of this kind been applied to the US Administration it is 
at least possible that some of the major divergences be-
tween the Ten and the US that have occurred in recent years 
could have been avoided. 
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67. One way of trying to reduce tensions and of en-
couraging the growth of confidence between Eastern and 
Western European countries would be for the Ten to 
examine with the COMECON countries - either collectively 
or individually - ways in which economic, technical and 
scientific contacts could be developed, to the mutual 
long-term benefit of both sides in years to come. 
Apart from the central issue of trade relations between 
the EEC and COMECON, where there has been little progress 
in recent years (despite the efforts made at the Madrid 
CSCE follow-up conference), mainly because of a cooling 
of the general temperature of East-west political and 
strategic relations, there are a number of subjects which 
could be discussed. 
68. These include the aims agreed at Madrid, such as: 
the development of trade relations and industrial coopera-
tion; reduction or elimination of obstacles to trade; 
creation of better conditions to encourage business nego-
tiations and operations; development of contacts between 
sellers and buyers; the development of better business 
communications, including telecommunications, and the 
improvement of facilities for businessmen; the publication 
and diffusion of economic and business information; the 
improvement of economic and commercial statistics, on a 
comparable basis; the development of means to settle inter-
national business disputes; etc. The framework in which 
contacts of this kind would be developed is the UN's 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). 
69. The Ten might also re-examine some of the proposals 
made before the first Helsinki CSCE in view of the pos-
sibility of making progress. on an East-West basis in 
these fields. These include: improvement of East-West 
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transport communications; the development of an East-
West electric power grid and the coordination of East-
West freight traffic, together with East-West coopera-
tion in medical research and cooperation in trying to 
improve the purity of European seas. 
70. Whereas major EEC - Eastern European economic and 
trading initiatives seem likely to continue to be inhi-
bited by political and strategic factors in the imme-
diate future, the commission and the Ten (within the 
framework of CSCE follow-up) could usefully examine what 
practical progress might be made in furthering East-West 
cooperation concerning subjects such as those listed 
above. 
71. The Ten should strengthen the UN in its peace-
keeping role by contributing contingents to peace-keeping 
forces in troubled areas. Some Member States within the 
Ten already have a most creditable record in this respect. 
As Mr Haagerup pointed out in his recent report to Parliament 
the participation of some Community countries in the 
peace-keeping force in Sinai is significant since this 
force, unlike previous peace-keeping forces, is not a 
UN one. Equally significant has been the presence of 
British, French and Italian troops in the Lebanon, once 
more in a non-UN force. The question arises of whether 
a contingent officially representing the Ten as such, 
even if it is not composed of elements from all Member 
States, might not be a useful contribution in the future. 
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72. Quite apart from contributing to the peace-keeping activities 
of the UN, the Ten could examine what further steps it might take 
concerning the maintenance of world security. 
73. As a long-term aim the Ten should seek the reduction and 
eventual elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces, on 
a balanced, mutual and verifiable basis, in Western and Eastern 
Europe and in the Soviet Union. They should therefore, within 
the framework of EPC, give every encouragement to the US and 
the Soviet Union to resume the INF negotiations at Geneva or to 
develop new and more comprehensive negotiations covering both 
strategic and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. 
74. The Ten should improve consultation with the 
US Administration, through EPC, possibly through a 
'super-Gymnich Formula' as outlined earlier, to ensure 
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that they are fully informed and consulted concerning 
American decisions in all major arms control and re-
duction negotiations before these are taken. 
75. In the immediate future and until such time as 
mutually acceptable agreements are reached at any 
resumed Geneva talks the Ten should support the deploy-
ment of Pershing-IIs and cruise missiles in Western 
Europe. 
(F) The Middle East 
76. The Ten, in EPC, should consider taking diplomatic 
initiatives directed at obtaining a solution to the 
Middle East problem based on Resolutions 242 and 338 of 
the UN Security Council, the Venice Declaration of the 
Nine and the main principles and key points of the peace 
plans proposed by Prince Fahd in 1981 and by the Confe-
rence of Arab Heads of State, at Fez, in 1982. In pre-
paring such initiatives the Ten should seek the support 
of Eg~t as well as the Arab League. Acting through EPC 
the Ten.should attempt to restrict the US military role 
in Lebanon to one of internal peace-keeping involving no 
further cross-frontier military operations. The Ten should 
seek to influence the US Administration to return to a 
balanced Middle East policy aiming at a solution in which 
the recognition and integrity of Israel are balanced by 
self-determination for the Palestinian people. 
(G) s~~~! 
77. The Foreign Ministers, acting in EPC, should try 
to promote a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus problem 
within an international framework. They should attempt· to 
prepare and convene an international conference on Cyprua 
at which the Cypriot and Turkish Governmenta, together 
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with representatives of the Turkish community, should 
participate along with the Ten. It would seem useful 
to involve the UN in the preparation of such a confe-
rence. 
(H) ~~E!~~~=~~-~~~-~~E~E=~~-~==~E!~~ 
78. Apart from intensifying its questions, under 
Rules 44 and 46, to the Council and the Foreign Ministers 
meeting in EPC on the security aspects of their work, 
and intensifying its examination of the security aspects 
of the work carried out in EPC, within the framework of 
the colloquies, Parliament's Political committee should 
set up a permanent subcommittee on the political aspects 
of security in order to prepare adequately regular dis-
cussions on significant security matters directly af-
fecting the Community or the Ten both in the Political 
Committee and in plenary. 
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ANNEX I 
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1982-1983 
Document 1-1294/82 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr MOMMERSTEEG,Sir James SCOTT-HOPKINS, 
Mr SPINELLI, Mr C JACKSON, Mr R JACKSON, 
Mr BLUMENFELD, Mr HUTTON, Mr CROUX, Mr PRAG, 
Mr J.M. TAYLOR, Mr PURVIS, Mr EISMA, Sir Henry PLUMB, 
I\ 
Mr SALZER, Mr SAYN-WITTGENSTEIN, Mr DELOROZOY, 
Mr PENDERS, Mr GEURTSEN, Mr PROVAN, Mr CALVEZ, 
Miss HOOPER, Mrs RABBETHGE, Mrs SCRIVENER, Lord O'HAGAN, 
Mr HERMAN, Mr DE GUCHT, Mr PRICE, Mr GEROKOSTOPOULOS, 
Mr de GOEDE, Mr BATTERSBY, Mr DONNEZ, Mr NOTENBOOM, 
Mr MARSHALL, Mr LOUWES, Mr JANSSEN VAN RAAY, 
Mr SPENCER, Mr SIMMONDS, Mr IRMER, Mr BORD, 
Mr FERGUSSON, Lord BETHELL, Mr MERTENS, Mr HARRIS, 
Mr HAAGERUP, Mr DIANA, Mr ISRAEL, Mr SHERLOCK, 
Mr RINSCHE, 
,, 
Mr POTTERING, Mrs GAIOTTI DE BlASE, 
Mr NORD, Mr PINTAT, Mr REMILLY, Mr SCHALL, 
Mr BERKHOUWER, Mr MAHER, Mr d 1 0RMESSON, Mr GAWRONSKI, 
Mr PAULHAN, Mr CECOVINI, Mr VANKER~HOVEN, Mr GALLAND 
and Lord HARMAR-NICHOLLS 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on an inventory of shared European interests, risks 
and requirements in the security field 
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The European Parliament, 
A. having regard to the resolution on European political 
cooperation and European security (Doe. 1-946/82> 
I 
B. having regard to the importance and topicality of the data 
relating to European security and the influence of such data 
on progress in the construction of Europe, 
Requests the relevant Committee, on the basis of the principles set 
out in the HAAGERUP report, to draw up an inventory and carry out a 
thorough analysis of shared European interests, risks and 
requirements in the security field and to draw up a report on this 
subject by 1 January 1984. 
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Working Documents 
1983-1984 '< 
15 July 1983 DOCUI'I€NT 1-587183 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr MARSHALL and 29 others 
' \ 
- ~ursuant to Rule 47 of the< Rules of Procedure 
on the sale of arms to Argentina by France 
' .:'(-
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The furopr.- Parli,..nt, 
A. dlstloriftl the Atllfttfnian hwelfOft of the FaUtlaftdl and tht lo11 of ltft c....a 
br the IIOCtt Rillfltl, 
1. aindful of the Uftdlaocratic nature of the Arltfttiftfan Govtr"-tnt, 
c. noting the ct.plorlblt failure of the Arttfttinian Govtf'Miftt to f'tftOUMt te.e usr 
of force ... ifttt the Fatkllftds, 
0. rc~embPring that the citizens of the Falklands do not Wlftt to bt colonized bJ the' 
Argent;niMI, 
E. condtMiftl reports that Fr..ce is toi"' to tUIIItlJ Artffttiu vftla ••DM · ~ 
deadl ter t.._ laocets, 
1. Calls ..- tilt Frenclt and ell IC lovt,..,.tl to rtftCU'tct tM1 tr .. •tell is 
dtstructtw of lfttra•COiflliunttr f•Uftl and could be •1tructiV. •t 1Mt111 Uft and 
fretdoa; 
3. Instructs its Prtlfdeftt to forward tltis· rtsolutiOft to both tltt. COUMfl aRd the 
c..-tssfOft of the lur_..,, C_,.tt'fes. 
,. 
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EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents · 
-1983-1984 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr KYRKOS 
DOCUMENT 1•644/83 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on postponing the deployment of Pershing 
and Cruise missiles in Europe 
-45 - PE 88.462/ res .If ir.v Ann. II I 
A. whereas tn~·nuct:ear -arms race prings the threat of a thermonuclear 
disaster cto~e'r 1iri;t~~d\ of averting it, 
B. believing that a basis can be found at the Geneva talks for an 
agreement guaranteeing the bala-nce of forces and setting out the stages 
-~ c/f· ~·-f;>'~si,'i!'e! rtduet'i-~n. ~~n nrissfies'·'~nd, nuel~ar- warheads in Europe, 
" f; :•; \. \-._, ,•(;/' ~~ -lA ,i; ,, ),,<t~{, 1 \.,",~ }•1 • -~ '~, , '.;• •. -~~ <_ • 
··unti(.such time as a general disarmament agreement is achieved, 
C. whereas lack of time must not occasion the taking of steps which will 
lead inevitably to fresh and_hi~he! stages in the arms race, _with 
unfor~seeable.-and;e~tremely grave consequence for East-West 
relations over Europe, 
D. sensitive to the anxieties and expectations of public opinion, 
1. Recommends the interested governments to postpone the 
deployment .of Pershing and Cruise missiles on European 
territory for.six months to give the parties to the 
Geneva talks time to reach agreement; 
2. Appeals to the two greatest powers to adopt the Language 
of self-control and moderation, to refrain from any 
attempt to secure supremacy in the military field, since 
such a thing is unattainable and merely exacerbates 
the arms race, and to cooperate with the other European 
countries in a programme of progressive, balanced 
disarmament to rid Europe of the threat of becoming 
the theatre of a nuclear war; 
3. Instructs its President to forward this motion for a 
resolution to the Council of Ministers meeting in political 
cooperation, the governments of the Member States and 
the governments of the USA and the Soviet Union. 
' ' ' ' I ~ 
- 46 - PE 88.462/res./fin/Ann.III 
9 January 1984 
English Edition 
ANNEX---rv--------------
European Communities 
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT 
Working Documents 
1983-1984 
DOCUMENT 1-1253/83 
MOTION FOR A RESOLUTION 
tabled by Mr MARKOPOULOS and Mrs VAN DEN HEUVEL 
on behalf of the Socialist Group 
pursuant to Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure 
on peace movements in the Member States 
of the Community 
- 47 - PE 88.462/fin./Ann.IV 
The Europu!' __ Par_~~-~~!."!, 
A. Wherus 
the arms race has reached a particularly dangerous stage and the nuclear 
weaponry already installed is, in theory, sufficient to destroy our 
planet ten times ov~r, 
the ss 20 missiles based in Europe and the Pershing and Cruise missiles 
being install~d on Community territory now create the conditions for a 
direct nuclear confrontation on European soil of which the one certain 
outcome would be the total destruction of Europe, 
the technological precision of the new Cruise missiles enables them to 
locate their target whilst evading the enemy's tracking systems, and 
for this reason the latter could be induced to retaliate under no more 
• than the psychological influence of a fear of attack', 
the eagerness with ~nich the installation of these missiles is demanded 
strengthens tne view that the idea of a localized nuclear war <with 
Europe as the ~robable theatre> has already taken hold and is within 
the bounds of possibility, 
8. Recognizing, for the reasons set out above, that: 
the nations of Europe are increasingly di~turbed at the possibility 
now perfectly plausible -of a nuclear conflict and have expressed 
their concern more and more strongly in recent years in the form of 
movements and deMonstrations with a purely pacific character, 
the inevita~le consequence of this state of mind was the formation, in 
most Europea~ countr1es, of var1ous genuinely independent peace move•ents 
detern;ined to aenounce any action, from whichever side, that increases 
tens1on anc to striv·tt to rid Europtt of all weapons of mass destruction, 
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C. ~oting that: 
it is not possible for the people of Europe to express their desire 
and their demand for an end to nuclear armament through the political 
will by which they are guided when vcting for the political party of 
their choice, since various other internal and external socio-political 
factors are involved in shaping their pol1tical outlook, 
the peace movements, standing over and above all party-political con-
siderations, are th~refore the only true outlets for the genuine 
expression of the popular desire and demand for peace, 
the contribution of these movements to the cause of peace is gro~ing 
daily, and tnat they already constitute a means of exerting pressure to 
dissuaae cold-~ar actions and to create a climate of rapprochement 
between East and West, 
o. Yhereas: 
the governments of all the Member States profess a desire to play their 
part in improving East-~est relations and consolidating peace, ~hich 
would allow grave and pressing social problems to be resolved and ~ould 
result in prosperity for their countries, 
in theory no government of the Member States of the Community denies 
the legitimacy of the people's demand to participate in the endeavours 
that need to be made to achieve peace, 
the prime minister of one of the ten MembP.r States has already officially 
recognized the peace movement in h1s country as a necessary link between 
the people and the government for directly conveying the wishes of the 
former to the latter and also for ensuring that the government's endeavours 
to establish peace in the ~orld m~et with the r•sponse of popular support, 
1. Calls on the gov•rnrnents of the Member States to bear in •ind that the 
existence, operat1on and action of the peace eovements in the Memoer 
States of the Community are the conseQuence of the situation that has 
arisen and serve the cause of peace; 
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2. Calls on the governments of the Me~b~r states therefore to establish 
intensive contact with the peace movements; 
3. Decides to organize as soon as possible, during one of its forthcoming 
part-sessions, a hearing on which representatives of the peace movements 
will be invited to take part; 
4. Instructs its President to forward this resolution to the Foreign 
Ministers and the governments of the Member States of the Community .• 
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